Regional Security Organizations and National Interests: Analyzing the NATO-Greek Relationship by Danopoulos, Constantine P.
San Jose State University
SJSU ScholarWorks
Faculty Publications Political Science
October 1988
Regional Security Organizations and National
Interests: Analyzing the NATO-Greek Relationship
Constantine P. Danopoulos
San Jose State University, constantine.danopoulos@sjsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/pols_pub
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Constantine P. Danopoulos. "Regional Security Organizations and National Interests: Analyzing the NATO-Greek Relationship"
Journal of Political and Military Sociology (1988): 263-277.
REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS 

AND NATIONAL INTERESTS: 

ANALYZING THE NATO-GREEK RELATIONSHIP 

CONSTANTINE P. DANOPOULOS 

San Jose State University 

Santa Clara University 

Journal of Political and Military Sociology 1988, Vol. 16 (Fall): 263-277 
This article analyzes the reasons which account for Greece's continuing 
membership in the Atlantic Alliance, even though NATO has not lived up 
to expectations and has failed to protect the nation's security against threats 
from Turkey. Following a brief examination of Greek attitudes toward 
NATO and the nat.ure of dissatisfaction, the article argues that strategic con· 
cerns are, at best, of secondary importance. Instead, Greece's continuing 
membership in the Alliance is a result of the nation's economic ties to the 
West and the dependency of its military on NATO and Washington for ad· 
vanced training, arms, war materiel, and other professional considerations. 
The article concludes that domestic industrial-military complexes of small 
countries become closely connected to and often depend on alliance 
industrial-military complexes. Leaving military alliances, therefore, 
becomes difficult for professional military as well as domestic economic in­
terests. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April4, 1949, nine West European countries plus Canada and the United 
States (US) signed a treaty whose goals would be to unite the efforts of the "free 
and democratic" nations against what was said to be the advancing forces of In­
ternational Communism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
born.l Collective security, promotion and protection of democratic values, ter­
ritorial integrity, political Independence, security, and respect for each other's 
sovereign rights were the basic and fundamental principles agreed upon by the 
signators of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Historical, geopolitical, and siTategic considerations, especially in light of the 
Soviet-American cold war, convinced the members of the Atlantic Alliance, and 
particularly its leading member, the US, to enlarge its southern flank by including 
Greece and Turkey in 1952. Viewing it as essential to the "future of the Near and 
Middle East" (Wittner, 1982:53), the US, NATO's ultimate policy formulator2 
(Fedder, 1973: 123; Kaplan eta!., 1985:XVI), overcame initial British and Scan· 
dinavian objections and manag~d to secure Greece's entry into the Allliance. Bat· 
tered by the civil war (1946-49), with an economy in shambles, and the old and 
"insidious hablt of appealing to one or more powers for help" (Kaltchas, 
1940:34-35) still alive, Greek elites saw in NATO a new protector. Operating on 
the notion that "neutrality is neither possible nor acceptable" (Loulis, 
1984/85:376), and that their nation's se<;uritv interests rested within the 
1. Alliance Is defined by Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan as 
"a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security 
issues." See their Unity and Disintegration In International Alliances: Comparative Studies 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons,. 1973), p. 4 . .Stephen M. Walt offers a similar if 
somewhat broader deflnition. For him an alliance "is afonnal or infor!1lal arrangement for 
security cooperation between two or more sovereign states." See The Origins of Alliances 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 12. 
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Alliance,3 Greek political leaders opted for membership, even though they "did 
not indeed know much about (or care to discuss publicly) the conditions under 
which Greece was joining" (Couloumbis, 1966:49). 
In spite of these overwhelming attitudes, membership in NATO has not fully 
met Greece's expectations. If anything, the majority of the Greek public as well as 
many of the country's leading political elites have repeatedly expressed 
dissatisfaction and disappointment with the Alliance's inability or unwillingness to 
safeguard Greece's security interests and respect the nation's political sovereign­
ty. But in spite of these Greece remains and is likely to continue a full-fledged and 
active member in the Atlantic Alliance. The aim of this essay is to identify and 
analyze the reasons which have kept this troubled partnership intact. The thesis 
the following pages seek to advance and substantiate is that professional military 
and economic ties, and not security considerations, account for Greece's conti­
nuing membership in the Atlantic Alliance. However, to better understand the 
reasons which account for the endurance of this relationship, a brief discussion of 
Greek attitudes toward NATO is in order. 
ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO 
NATO's goals were to safeguard the security, territorial integrity, and political 
independence of member states, and to promote freedom, the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Yet NATO has not lived up to 
these lofty ideals, as far as the majority of the Greeks is concerned. But the 
Alliance alone cannot be assigned the entire blame. Agreeing with the perception 
that "NATO's ... strategy [is] an extension of American ... strategy" (Fedder, 
1973:125), most Greeks see Washington as equally, if not mostly, responsible 
for this breach. Thus, virtually no distinction is made between NATO and 
American policies vis-a-vis Greece. 
The Alliance is not accused of having failed to protect Greece against threats, 
real or imaginary, emanating from the East. Instead, NATO and the US are 
reproached for: having intervened in the internal affairs of the country, which in­
cluded support for the Colonels' dictatorship (1967-1974); and failing to check 
Turkey's.expansionist designs against the territorial integrity of Greece. The latter 
2. A distinction is made between the leading and the rest of the numbers. As a super­
power the US is a giver rather than a recipient of security-related essentials such as arms, 
equipment, and training and therefore is considered more than an "equal" partner in 
NATO and other defense alliances to which it belongs. Edwin Fedder states that the Atlan­
tic Alliance's strategy is nothing more than "an extension of American personnel, 
technology and capital." See his NATO: The Dynamics of an Alliance (New York: Dodd, 
Mead and Company, 1973), p. 125. Christopher Jones reached a similar conclusion 
regarding the role of the U.S.S.R. in the Warsaw Pact. See his Soviet Influence in Western 
Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981). 
3. Greece is considered a small power. For Robert L. Rothstein a small power is "a 
state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities 
and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or 
developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must 
also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics." See his Alliances 
and Small States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 29. 
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includes inability or unwillingness on the part of NATO or the US to side with 
Greece regarding the Cyprus issue, and subsequently to preven~ Ankara's inva­
sion and occupation of the island; and parallel disagreements between the two 
countries over the Aegean, known as the Aegean dispute. The problems and 
manifestations surrounding these issues are beyond the scope of this essay and 
have been extensively analyzed elsewhere. 
Dissatisfaction with NATO has surfaced from nearly all segments of the political 
spectrum, save the extreme right. Refiecting widespread discontent with the 
Alliance's refusal to support Greece's "just" struggle to unite Cyprus with the 
motherland, the pro-Western but widely respected daily Kathemerini openly 
urged in 1955 "withdrawal from NATO" (cited in Verney, 198'7:255). Some 
years later, frustrated by what was perceived as the Alliance's "tilt" toward Turkey 
on the Cyprus dispute, the centrist government of George Papandreou apparent­
ly threatened to sever Athens' ties with NATO. The "national unity" government 
under the pro-Western Constantine Karamantis, in the wake of the 1974 Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus and the Alliance's failure to check Ankara's aggressive 
designs, was temporarily forced to pull Greece out of NATO's mihary 'Wing, vow­
ing not to return until the occupation troops had vacated the island. 
The left has been even more vociferous. The pro-Moscow Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE), as expected, has maintained a virulently anti-NATO position. But 
the most organized demands in favor. of severing ties with the Alliance came from 
.Andreas Papndreou's socialist party (PASO!';), before it came to pow,zr in 1981. 
The socialists viewed continuing membership as detrimental to the country's na­
tional security interests and blamed NATO and the US for the seven-year dic­
tatorship (1967-74), the Cyprus debacle In 1974, and Turkey's aggressive and 
intransigent behavior in the 1l\egean. Papandreou stated that even though "we 
belong to NATO, this alliance [has] refused to guarantee our frontiers [against 
Turkish attacks]" (Time 1981-39). The socialists' argument w&s reinforced by 
Brussels' and \Vashington's insistence on viewinH the Greco-Turkish disputes as 
outside the jurisdiction of the l'~IATO treaty. NATO poli<::y makers suggested that 
the two parties find solutions to their problems through bilateral negotiations -- a 
position Athens finds unacceptable and a clear indication of the Alliance's "tilt" 
toward Ankara. 
As a result of the Alliance's stands, popular sentiments in Greece against 
NATO and the US ran high throughout the 1970s, and although they seem to 
have subsided somewhat by the mid 1980s, still remain high. For example, a 
1977 survey revealed that 61.1% supported withdrawal from NATO, 10.6% 
were neutral, and 28.3% supported membership in the Alliance (Kourvetaris 
and Dobratz, 1981 :77). A 1985 survey showed that "only roughly one-fourth of 
the public ... approves of full NA!O membership, and has co:1fidence in [the 
Alliance's] ability to defend \/\/estern Europe" (Dimitras, 1985: 137). A more re­
cent public opinion poll found that 52% believe that NATO membersip has been 
detrimental to the nation's se:curity interests, and 57% hold the view that align­
ment with the US has hurt Greek national interests (Dimitras, 1987:'70). A 1982 
study found that 48% had not confidence at all in the US and 39% had very little. 
Distrust for the US was found to be "coterminous" with distrust toward NATO 
(cited in I<ourvetaris, 1987 :442). More than 90% of Greeks believe that Turkey 
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threatens the territorial integrity of their country (Dimitras, 1985: 137). Paul Ken­
nedy is on the mark when he observes that "the Greek and Turkish armed forces 
often seem more worried about each other than about the Warsaw Pact" 
(1987:473). 
The menace of International Communism, which was responsible for the for­
mation of NATO and Greece's membership in it, is no longer viewed by Greeks 
as a threat to the territorial and political integrity of their country. Only 22% of the 
respondents saw the Soviet Union as a threat and 19% saw Albania in this light. 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were perceived as dangerous by less than 10% 
(Dimitras, 1984). Since 1974, Athens' relations with other Balkan countries, 
especially Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, have improved substantially. A 
four-decade long de jure state of war with Albania was recently terminated. Dur­
ing the height of the Greco-Turkish conflict of March 1987, when war between 
the two NATO partners appeared likely, Prime Minister A. Papandreou dis­
patched his foreign minister to Sofia for consultations with the Bulgarian leader­
ship. In so far as Athens is concerned, it is Turkey and not the Warsaw Pact that 
poses a threat to Greece's security. 
In spite of overwhelming sentiments distrusting NATO, Greece remains in the 
Atlantic Alliance. In fact, both conservative and socialist governments had to eat 
their words. Although public opinion polls indicated that 58% of Greeks favored 
"neutrality" and only 12% supported re-entry, the New Democracy government 
of George Rallis successfully negotiated Greece's return to the military wing of 
NATO (1981), even though the problems which had prompted withdrawal from 
the military wing of the Alliance in 1974 had not been eradicated (Melakopides, 
1987: 560n). As leader of the opposition A. Papandreou bitterly denounced the 
return as a sellout. Later, when he assumed the reins of government (1981), he 
stated that Greece would limit its military commitments to NATO (New York 
Times, 1981). 
Notwithstanding Greece's less acquiescent stance and willingness to differen­
tiate its pqsitlon from the Alliance on such issues as the imposition of martial law 
in Poland and the downing of the Korean jetliner by the Soviet Union in 
September 1983, the Papandreou government gradually mellowed its once 
scathing criticism of NATO and the US. Finally in January 1987, citing con­
tinu.ous problems with Turkey, Prime Minister Papandreou reversed his previous 
stance and categorically declared in Parliament that withdrawal from NATO 
"would render war with Turkey inevitable" (cited in Couloumbis, 1987: 15). Even 
the severest of the Alliance's critics, the pro-Moscow Greek Communist Party, 
seems to have taken a more conciliatory attitude lately. Younger and more 
reform-minded party cadre appear prepared to accept continuing membership, 
at least for the near future (Petras, 1987: 22). 
Why this about face? The explanation given by Greek political leaders is that 
strategic imperatives forced both the conservatives and the socialists to swallow 
their pride and put the nation's security before political gains and ideological 
dispositions. This view, which is supported by a number of academic writings, 
assumes that severing relations with NATO would enhance Turkey's strategic im­
portance as far as Washington and Burssels are concerned, and correspondingly 
would render Greece more vulnerable to Ankara's expansionist designs 
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(Coufoudakis, 1985:212; Axt, 1984:204-206; Melakopides, 1987; Papacosma, 
1985). According to this argument, the pro-Western Karamanlis and his suc­
cessor, George Rallis, never ceased subscribing to the notion that Greece's 
strategic interests can best be served within the Alliance. Even the Cyprus dispute 
and other difficulties with Turkey can only be dealt with in the Alliance 
framework. The decision to withdraw from the military wing of NATO in 1974 
was taken as a temporary measure to pacify public opinon, "which demanded an 
assertion of independence against the feeble reactions of the allies" (Woodhouse, 
1985: 169). Papandreou's public statements, at least, would seem to confirm the 
strategic argument. 
However, the strategic thesis provides only a partial explanation and may, in 
fact, be of less importance than is perceived. If Washington and Brussels failed to 
put the brakes on Turkey in the past and continue to take a hands-off attitude 
regarding the Aegean, while supporting the Turkish position by suggesting a 
negotiated settlement, it is difficult to see how Karamanlis, Rallis, and especially 
Papandreou would base their policies to return and remain in NATO solely on the 
strength of the strategic position. As late as January 1987, Prime Minister Papan­
dreou gave evidence to the contrary during a debate in Parliament: "[l]t has been 
demonstrated that NATO has not protected even the frontiers or the national in­
tegrity of our country, particularly in the critical region of the Aegean" (Spotlight, 
1987:4). Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Yannis Charalam­
bopoulos went even further, stating on October 4, 1987 that "NATO is indirectly 
supporting Turkey's expansionist designs, and the provocative stance adopted by 
the Alliance in the [Aegean] area is increasing tension rather than reducing it" 
(Spotlight, 1987:5). 
If the Atlantic Alliance did not safeguard Greece's interests in the past, there is 
little reason for Karamanlis, Hallis, and more recently Papandreou to think that 
NATO will be more forthcoming in the future. Washington and Brussels continue 
to view Greco-Turkish problems as beyond the Alliance's jurisdiction and have 
unequivocally declined Papandreou's request to guarantee Greece's security in 
the event of a Turkish attack. After all, Cyprus was occupied during the time 
Greece was a member of the Alliance, not when membership was partially 
suspend~d. Re-entry has neither provided ·guarantees against future Turkish ag­
gressive behavior nor has it brought solution to the Cyprus and Aegean problems 
any closer yet. And who is to say that the country was any more or any less secure 
during the partial suspension period (1974-1981)? 
Without altogether rejecting the merits of the strategic thesis, there ctppear two 
other reasons which seem to provide a better explanation regardinB Greece's 
return and continuing participation in NATO: the role of the armed forces, and 
economic ties to the West, especially the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Let us elaborate on each one separately. 
THE ROLE OF THE MIUTARY 
In recent decades the separation between foreign and security policies of 
nation-states has become indistinct. It is difficult, if not impossible, to perceive that 
the formulation of a country's national security policy has no impact on its foreign 
policy orientation, and vice versa. In fact, same argue that since World War II, 
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security considerations have a more decisive impact on foreign policy (Yarmolin­
sky, 1971). Given the paramount role of national security and increasing military 
defense budgets, it is only natural for those who specialize in the "stuff" of war 
--the military-- to play an important part in the foreign policy of modern states. 
The military's professionalization and expertise in handling ever more com­
plicated weapons and modes of warfare have strengthened their position and 
sharpened their ability to participate in formulating national security affairs; 
foreign policy included (Abrahamsson, 1972:19-20; Bietz, 1972). 
In addition, professionalization has turned the military into a powerful and po­
tent pressure group. The latter, of course, can be important in both developed 
and developing policies as well as democratic, totalitarian, or authoritarian 
regimes. Thus, the military are able and willing to influence security and foreign 
policies either through normative, institutional, and/or group processes or a 
combination thereof. If everything else fails, the military, if necessary, can in­
fluence the process by means of a coup or a threatened one. 
Military professionalization is a function of two processes. One refers to en­
vironmental factors such as political stability, level of economic development, 
and historical experiences; and two refers to internal socialization processes. En­
vironmental factors involve "the creation and maintenance of a complex, effec­
tive, and well organized social institution," while the socialization process involves 
"the indoctrination and internalization of certain values, outlooks, and behavior 
elements" (Abrahamsson, 1972, 16-17; Danopoulos, 1985). This, then, implies 
that factors that contribute to the professionalization of a nation's armed forces at 
a given time are bound to have a major impact in shaping the attitudes and 
perceptions of the military. Participation in defense alliances (such as NATO), 
and dependency on them for equipment and support often lead the military of 
member states (especially smaller ones) to view participation in and adherence to 
the basic principles of a "common bloc" as "positive" and even indispensable, for 
they improve "the position of each individual country against the common adver­
sary." Concern for the security of the state, which is the primary mission of the 
military, "is transformed into a favo~:able opinion for the defense community," in 
so far as the officer corps is concerned (Abrahamsson, 1972:83). 
The evolution and role of the Greek military exemplify the above description. 
Beginning in 1947, American military and economic aid (see Table 1) and subse­
quent participation in NATOfacilit&ted the professionalization, autonomy, and 
independent posture of the Greek army by providing It wjth funds, equipment, 
sophisticated training in allied installations, and support. More than half of the 
total aid went to t!:te military. The overall thrust of the training prqgrams was 
"dogmatically anti-Communist" and highly pro-NATO oriented, reflecting the 
fundamental g9als and p~rceptiqns of American foreign and defense policies 
(Wolpin, 1972:52). Since the highly factionalized political parties of Greece pro­
vided little comfort to American and NATO policy makers who wanted to see the 
country's instability y!elcl to an effective and stable regime, the Western-trained, 
fiercely anti-Communist and pro-NATO Greek military was perceived as the in­
stitution capable of accomplishing th/i1S€ objectives. Onder the circumstances the 
military was transformep into the single most powerful "political force within the 
country" (Roubatis, 1979:55), with growing influence in the elaboration of policy 
----
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and a homogeneous, die-hard, right wing organization which no longer reflected 
"the contradictions of the political society" (Alivizatos, 1978:37). 
TABLE 1. AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO GRE~~E 
(1946-1964 in millions of dollars) 
YEAR ECONOMIC AID MILITARY AID 
Grants Loans 
1946-48 198.4 

1949-52 706.7 323.5 

1953-57 153.0 :35.0 433.:' 

1958 15.7 12.0 143 .-~ 

1960 	 25.6 31.0 116.7 
1961 20.4 42.8 

1962 20.3: 10.0 34.9 

1963 0.1 31.6 85.8 

196ll 0.1 7.7 83.2 

Source: 	U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from 

r:nt"ernational organfzat"ion:s;A".LD. Special Report, 

prepared annually for the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee, Washington, DC, 1965. 

The Greek military's indisputable Atlantic credentials have been displayed 
readily in the postwar period. Fearing that a reduction of budgetary appropria­
tions for defense, proposed by the Karamanlis government, would weaken 
Greece's commitment to NATO, the armed forces were quick to plot in 1962 
against the very government they had helped maintain in power (b~/ taking part in 
the electoral fraud of a year earlier). Moreover, Greek military officers spoke ap­
provingly of the virtues of NATO and its contributions to world peace. The over­
whelmingly pro-NATO attitudes of the military contrasted sharply with the anti­
American and anti-NATO sentiments prevalent in Greece during and after the 
years of praetorian rule. 
The military's pro-NATO attitudes became even more apparent in their hand­
ling of the Cyprus issue. While publicly prodaiming their support for Enosis 
(union of Cyprus with Greece), the praetorian rulers adhered to American­
NATO wishes to work out the dispute biiateraliy (with Turkey). Thev undertook a 
series of moves -- ranging from political pressure to outright coups -- to force the 
Greek-Cypriot leadership to accept a solution certain to lead the partition of the 
island-republic. The July 1974 overthrow of President Archbishop Makarios was 
but the last scene in a long string of intrigues against the popular Cypriot leader by 
the Athens praetorian regime. But the plot backfired, and the Greek military were 
forced to return to the barracks amidst public indignation and loss of prestige. 
ln spite of this debacle it would be foolhardy to assume that the Greek military 
no longer play a role in the elaboration of the nation's security policy. Unlike the 
past, the post-junta influence of the officer corps seems to be channeled within 
the institutional-legal framework. Greek officers have improved their bctrgaining 
capabilities and negotiating skills and have a greater understanding and apprecia­
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tion of the processes and virtues of pressure group tactics and politics. More 
Greek officers today are versed in foreign languages, especially English and a 
greater number of them receive postgraduate training abroad in West European 
and American military academies. The US and other NATO countries have been 
and remain Greece's primary arms suppliers. For example, between 1964 and 
1973, out of a total of $941 million spent toward purchasing arms and other war 
materiel, $792 million worth came from US suppliers, $42 million from France, 
and $98 million from West Germany. In the 1974-1979 period out of a total of $2 
billion, $1.2 billion was spent in the American arms market, $390 million in the 
French, $230 million in the German, and $80 million in the Canadian, British, 
and Italian combined. The 1981-1985 period reflects an effort by the Papan­
dreou government to diversify Greece's sources of arms procurement. From a 
total of about $1.9 billion spent on war-related equipment, $95 million worth 
came from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, $600 million from other coun­
tries (not including Warsaw Pact nations), and the remainder ($1.3 billion) from 
the US and other NATO countries. In spite of the latest arms diversification ef­
forts, Greece's dependence on the Atlantic Alliance for war materiel remains very 
strong (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985). 
Moreover, preoccupation with the Turkish threat is pervasive and the single 
most important concern in the country. Almost 20% of total government expen­
ditures are devoted to defense, and about 20 out of 1000 people are in military 
uniform (see Table 2). Both of these are among the world's highest and have 
domestic, economic, soc:ial, and psychological repercussions. The Greco­
Turkish conflict has bolstered the standing as well as the influence of the Greek 
armed forces in the post-junta period, despite the humiliation the military suffered 
as a result of the seven-year dictatorship and the Cyprus debacle. 
TABLE 2. GREEK MILITARY EXPENDITURES, ARMED FORCES, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
YEAR M.E. (current %ME MEN IN UNIFORM MEN IN UNIFORM 
millions GE (in thousands) (per 1000 people) 
$U.S.) 
1974 1467 18.7 186 20.7 
1975 1903 22.3 185 20.5 
1976 2045 20.9 186 20.3 
1977 2157 20.4 187 20.0 
1978 2196 19.5 186 19.8 
1979 2132 18.6 187 19.5 
1980 1954 15.9 186 19.3 
1981 2404 17.3 188 19.3 
1982 2377 18.6 186 19.0 
1983 2195 15.0 177 18.0 
1984 2515 16.8 197 19.9 
Source: ~Military Expenditures~ Arms Transfers 1986. U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. Washington, DC, 1987. 
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The dramatic events of the last quarter of a century have not siBnificantly 
altered the attitudes of the Greek military with regard to NATO and the US. In 
sharp contrast to the civilian society, the military continues to be favorably in­
clined toward the Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. Though diminished in intensity, 
the East-West conflict provides the context through which Greek officers view the 
world, and see NATO as important to the defense of Europe. Agreeing with their 
counterpalis in other NATO countries, the Greek military recognizes the need for 
the US, as the leading non-Communist power, to play a prominant role in for­
mulating the Alliance's strategies. The military also views American participation 
in NATO as almost indispensable. Finally, Greek officers see attendance in 
Western, and especially American, military academies as important and very 
beneficial for professional advancement and promotion. Such perceptions of a 
less political but more professional military institution, operating in a security­
conscious society, influence Greek security policies, including participation in 
NATO. The Soviet·-American rapprochement is unlikely to alter these attitudes in 
the foreseeable future. 
!ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Although the strategic-military commitment was the primary element in 
Greece's relationship with the Atlantic Alliance, economic considerations soon 
followed a concomitant path. In the eyes of American and NATO policy makers, 
establishment of a viable economy was a necessary prerequisite for social stability 
and a pro-Western orientation. Toward this end American economic aid poured 
into the war-devastated country (see Table 1), resulting in the integration of "the 
Greek economy into the Western economic system as it was being reshaped after 
the war" (Thomadakis, 1980:75). 
In the initial stages Western involvement in the Greek economy took the form 
of government-to-government loans and grants. This public sector cooperation 
gradually and increasingly was complemented by private sector linkages. Law 
Decree 2687, introduced by the Greek government in 1953, was desig:ned to at­
tract foreign capital into the country by providing legal protection as well as a host 
of economic incentives to foreign firms investing in the Greek economy. This law 
became "the major vehicle for the inflow and penetration of foreign (mainly 
Western) investment into the Greek economy" (Thomadakis, 1980:77), con­
tributing to economic improvement and "dep;;mdent capitalist industrialization" 
(Mouzelis, 1980:254; Evangelinides, 1979; Papandreou, 1981; Freris, 1986; 
Gianaris, 1984; Fotopoulos, 1978). By and large American and West European 
firms invested in such areas as petrochemicals, metallurgical products, transport 
equipment, minerals, paper, and rubber, which amount to over 60% of 
manufacturing activity in the country (Evangel.inides, 1979: 189). Tobacco, tex­
tiles, food processing, and other traditional areas were left to domestic capital and 
control. 
The fall of the dictatorship in 1974 and the eventual rise to power of the 
socialists ip 1981 did little to lessen Greece's economic dependency on the West. 
The nation's total external debt has been steadily rising during the last two 
decades. It reached a whopping 17 billion dollars in 1986. Inflation during the 
same period has hov,ered at about 20%, and current budget def.cits have been 
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climbing at an alarming rate, reaching 3,250 million dollars in 1986, while public 
sector borrowing soared to 17.9% of total government spending in the same 
year. The level of imports reached 6.655 million dollars in 1986 while exports 
stood at 2,850 million dollars (Spotlight, 1987). As before 1974, Greece's main 
trade partners have been and continue to be OECD countries. In 1980, 73% of 
imports and 80% of exports involved trade with OECD --figures about 30% 
higher than during the 1950s and 1960s. Owing to the "stabilization program" 
the Papandreou government introduced in late 1985 and the drop in oil prices, 
inflation has been brought down to about 12% and there has been a correspon­
ding improvement in other areas such as the budget deficit, domestic investment, 
and trade. In spite of these, Greece's economic dependency on the West remains 
as high as it was in the pre-1974 era. The Economist's assertion that the Papan­
dreou government "may be needing American help to climb out of its present 
economic hole" is not totally without foundation (1986:39). 
Perhaps the clearest example of Greece's dependency on the West is tourism. 
Regarded by the present as well as past governments as "a significant factor in the 
economic, social, political, and ecological development of the country" (EOT, 
1985:19), tourist activity is inexorably tied to the pleasures of vacation-seeking 
citizens of the more affluent West. Table 3 makes abundantly clear that on 
average, more than 60% of those visiting the picturesque beaches of Greece 
come from NATO countries. This lucrative source of revenue is simply too impor­
tant to be jeopardized. 
TABLE 3. TOURISTS IN GREECE 
YEAR TOTAL # TOTAL FROM NATO COUNTRIES %OF TOTAL 
1981 5,557.109 3,081.673 55.46 
1982 5,463.860 3,140.440 57.48 
1983 5,258.372 3,313.012 63.30 
1984 6,027.266 3,789.268 62.87 
1985 7,039.428 4,526.275 64.30 
1986 7,340.000 4,832.000 65.83 
1987* 8,004.000 5,475.000 68.40 
1988* 8,360.000 5,685.000 68.00 
Source: 	Statistics provided by the New York office of the Greek National 
Tourist Organization. 
* estimated 
NATO countries have been shown to have both the willingness and the means 
to influence events in Athens. For example, in June 1985 President Reagan, in 
the wake of terrorist incidents, issued a travel advisory causing a significant 
decline in the volume of tourism. In spite of the Greek government's efforts to 
condemn terrorism and assure tourists that Greece was a safe place to spend their 
vacations, earnings from tourism, one of the country's most important sources of 
foreign currency, fell almost 25% short of what had been projected that year. 
Remittances and potential investments by the over 2 million Greek-Americans 
could also be said to be an avenue through which Washington can influence 
economic policy in Athens. Pressure from Greek-Americans certainly caused the 
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Papandreou government to reverse its previous decision and to have Truman's 
statue restored to the same prime spot where it once stood, before it was da­
maged by those opposed to the continuation of American bases in Greece. 
Athens is actively courting Greek-Americans to invest in their ancestral land. 
Finally, Greece's strong economic ties with its partners in the EEC are another 
source of potential economic pressure. For instance, agricultural subsidies have 
been important to Greek farmers, and the Papandreou government is in no 
mood to jeopardize this source which has helped it gain the favor of rural Greeks. 
In spite of its many accomplishments, the EEC has yet to develop a substitute for 
NATO. Western Europe still depends on the Atlantic Alliance to act as its defense 
umbrella and the jitters displayed by European leaders regarding the impact of the 
recently signed INF Treaty between the two superpowers exemplify the impor­
tance Europeans attach to the Alliance. Pressure from European leaders, and 
especially from fellow socialist Francois Mitterant, may have been instrumental in 
convincing Prime Minister Papandreou to abandon his once criticall remarks 
against NATO, separate Greco-Turkish issues from those involving the Alliance 
and the US, and perhaps move toward an understanding with Turkey. (;iven the 
closeness of Greece's economic ties to the EEC it is fair to conclude that Athens 
would not risk alienating its European partners by severing its membership in 
NATO. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding pages sough to analyze the basic reasons which explain 
Greece's continuing participation In NATO, even though the country's ex­
periences with the Alliance have not lived up to expectations. The most poignant 
areas of Greece's discontent with the Alliance have been and continue to be 
American, and by implication NATO's, failure to protect the country's security in­
terests against threats from another NATO partner, Turkey; and disrespect for 
the nation's political sovereignty and independence. Then, the paper analyzed 
the reasons which account for Greece's continuing membership in the Alliance, 
despite dissatisfaction. The country's pro-Westem and US and NATO-trained 
and supplied military, and Greece's strong economic ties with members of the 
Alliance, more than strategic considerations, account for the return and continu­
ing participation in the Alliance. 
Although NATO and the US failed to support the Greek position in disputes 
with Turkey, and the Alliance has not lived up to its commitment as far as Greek 
public opinion is concerned, econornlc elites and the nation's powerful military 
establishment have had little reason to be dissatisfied. To the conservative 
political and economic elites American aid, Western investments, and participa­
tion in NATO provided and continue to provide security, financial benefits, and 
technological know-how. The latter has assumed even more importance if 
Greece is to compete effectively within the EEC. The socialists' ideological 
dispositions and rhetoric flew in the face of reality. The professional dependency 
of the Greek military on NATO for equipment, trainlng, and support has pro­
pagated the view that participation in and adherence to the basic principles of the 
Alliance is paramount. It is no accident that the military and the more affluent 
strata of the Greek society maintain pro-NATO attitudes at a time when public 
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opm1on polls consistently show dissatisfaction with the Alliance and the US 
(Dobratz, 1987). 
In other words, modern defense organizations, such as NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact, are more than mere agreements between states to combine their efforts to 
repel a common enemy. Instead, they constitute impressive organizations with 
permanent command structures responsible for formulating contingency plans to 
deal with possible uprising, riots, and other disturbances within member states 
which could threaten a member state's commitment to the alliance, in addition to 
external threats. It is no accident that the Greek colonels activated a NATO 
emergency plan called "Prometheus" to stage their coup in 1967. The latter was 
designed to mobilize the Greek army in case of an attempted take-over by the 
defeated and factionalized KKE operating in exile from Bucharest, Rumania. 
Finally, the business of defense is no longer a part-time effort, but a permanent, 
full-time, all-pervasive commitment inseparably tied to every sector of a society. 
Modern defense alliances are no different. Domestic defense establishments are 
closely tied if not subsumed by alliance efforts. Put differently, domestic 
industrial-military complexes are closely connected to and often dependent on 
alliance industrial-military complexes. Leaving modern defense alliances, such as 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, becomes difficult not only from a military point of 
view, but also from the point of view of domestic economic elites whose con­
tinued well-being may be closely fastened to the larger alliance domain. The 
Greek-NATO relationship seems to be a case in point. 
In sum, barring unforeseen developments (such as the highly improbable 
assumption of power by the KKE), Greece is unlikely to sever its relations with the 
Atlantic Alliance even if the ongoing contacts between Papandreou and Prime 
Minister Ozal of Turkey succeed in eradicating the possibility of war between the 
two countries -- a consideration publicly cited by the Greek leader as a justification 
necessitating Athens' continuing membership in NATO. 
REFERENCES 
Abrahamsson, Bengt 
1973 Military Professionalization and Political Power. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Alivizatos, Nicos 
1978 'The Greek Army in the late forties: towards an institutional 
autonomy." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 5 (Fall):37-45. 
Amen, Michael Mark 
1978 	 "American institutional penetration into Greek military and political 
policymaking structures: June 1947-0ctober 1949." Journal of the 
Hellenic Diaspora 5 (Fall) :89-113. 
Axt, Heinz-Jurgen 
1984 "On the way to self-reliance? PASOK's government policy in Greece." 
Journal of Modern Greek Sfudies 2 (October): 189-208. 
275 The NATO-Greek Security Relationship 
Bietz, Donald F. 
1972 The Role of the Military Professionals in US Foreign Policy. New York: 
Praeger. 
Couloumbis, Theodore A. 
1966 Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
1983 The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle. New 
York: Praeger. 
1987 	 "Greek-American relations since 1974." An unpublished paper 
presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association, Washington, DC, April 15-18. 
Danopoulos, Constantine P. 
1985 "Alliance participation and foreign policy influence: the rr:.ilitary's role." 
Armed Forces and Society 11:2 (Winter):271-290. 
Dimitras, Panayote E. (ed.) 
1984 "Greek public opinion" vol. 1 (A and L). 
1985 "Greece: a new danger." Foreign Policy 58:134-150. 
1987 "Changes in public attitudes." Pp. 64-68 in Kevin Featherstone and 
Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (eds). Political Change in Greece: Before and 
After the Colonels. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Dobratz, Betty A. 
1987 	 "Foreign policy and economic orientations influencing party preferences 
in the socialist nation of Greece." East European Quarterly XXI 
(Winter) :413-430. 
Evangelinides, Mary 
1979 	 "Core-periphery problems in the Greek case." In Dudly Seers, eta!. 
(eds). Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations. 
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press Inc. 
Economist 
1986 "Suddenly, we trust you." Jan. 18:39. 
Ellinikos Organismos Tourismou, Anaptyxi Symmetohi, Piotita Zois. Athens, Greece. 
1985 
Fedder, Edwin H. 
1973 NATO: The Dynamics of Alliance i.n the Postwar World. New York: 
Dodd, Mead, and Company. 
Fotopoulos, T. 
1978 ''Exartimeni Anaptyxi kai Ekviomihanisi." InSp. Papaspiliopoulos (ed). 
!Vleletes Pano stin Elliniki Oikonomia. Ahtens: Papazisis. 
Freris, A.F. 
1986 The Greek Economy In the Twentieth Century. New York: St. Martin's 
Press. 
Gianaris, Nicholas V. 
1984 Greece and Yugoslavia: An Economic Comparison. New York: 
Praeger. 
Kaltchas, Nicholas 
1940 Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Kaplan, Lawrence S., Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi (eds) 
1985 NATO and the Mediterranean. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 
Inc. 
276 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 
Kennedy, Paul 
1987 The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House. 
Kourvetaris, Yorgos A. 
1987 	 "The Southern flank of NATO: political dimensions of the Greco­
Turkish conflict Since 1974." East European Quarterly XXI 
(Winter) :431-446. 
Kourvetaris, George A. and Betty A. Dobratz 
1981 "Public opinion and civil-military relations in Greece since 1974." Jour­
nal of Strategic Studies 4:71-84. 
1987 A Profile of Modern Greece In Search of Identity. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Loulis, John C. 
1984/85 "Papandreou's foreign policy." Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter): 375-391. 
Melakopides, Constantine 
1987 "The logic of Papandreou's foreign policy." International Journal XLI 
(Summer): 559-584. 
Mouzelis, Nicos 
1980 "Capitalism and the development of the Greek state." In Richard Sease 
(ed), The State in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Papacosma, S. Victor 
1985 	 "Greece and NATO." Pp. 189-214 in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. 
Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi (eds), NATO and the Mediterranean. 
Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc. 
Papandreou, Vaso 
1981 Poliethnikes Epihiriseis kai Anaptyxi: I Periptosi tis Elladas. Athens: 
Gutenberg. 
Petras, James 
1987 "The contradictions of Greek socialism." New Left Review 163 (May­
June) :3-25. 
Roubatis, Yiannis P. 
1978 	 "The United States and the operational responsibilities of the Greek 
Armed Forces, 1947-1987." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 6 
(Fall): 39-5 7. 
Spotlight 
1987a "A broad consensus." Feb. :5. 
1987b "Categorically -- no!" Oct. :5. 
1987c "Economy figures best in ten years." Oct.: 1 & 3. 
Thomadakis, Stavros B. 
1980 	 "Notes on Greek-American economic relations." In Theodore A. 
Couloumbis and John 0. Iatrides (eds), Greek-American Relations: A 
Critical Review. New York: Pella. 
The New York Times 
1981 (December 9) 
Time 
1981 "Yes to the prospect of Allagi." (November 2) :38. 
Verney, Susannah 
1987 	 "Greece and the European Community." Pp. 253-270 in Kevin 
Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (eds). Political Change in 
Greece: Before and After the Colonels. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
277 The NATO-Greek Security Relationship 
Wittner, Lawrence S. 
1982 American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Wolpin, Miles D. 
1972 Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third Worid. Lexington, 
Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co. 
Woodhouse, C.W. 
1985 The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels. London: Granada. 
Wmld Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, U.S. 
1985 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, DC. 
Yarmolinsky, Adam 
1971 The Military Establishment. New York: Harper and Row. 
Copyright© 2003 EBSCO Publishing 
